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2.1 ICL and risk 
A well-known principle holds that equity provides better risk sharing 
opportunities than debt, but that there are greater enforcement problems 
associated with equity. Income contingent loans (ICL) represent an efficient 
(low transactions cost) way of implementing equity contracts for human 
capital.
1 
The amount the individual repays is dependent on his or her income. 
While it seems natural to link ICL with investments that increase the value of 
human capital - most notably education - there is no necessary reason to limit 
it to such investments. 
The limits on market provision ofICL are related to: (a) enforcement costs; 
(b) adverse selection; and ( c) moral hazard. Government provision lowers 
transactions costs because of the joint product of income reporting for 
purposes of the income tax. But reporting is imperfect, and the higher the 
effective tax rate (including the fraction of income committed in ICL 
repayments), the greater the incentive for underreporting. In some areas and in 
some countries, this is greater than others. This likely imposes an upper bound 
to the extent to which there can be reliance on ICL. For a coun!Jy like the US 
where a large fraction of transactions are electronic and where top income tax 
rates are low, the scope for vastly expanded use of ICL would seem large. 
Adverse selection effects can be serious, which is why ICL needs to be 
focused on areas where forced pooling (so those that rationally anticipate 
having high incomes don't drop out of the program2) seems plausible, such as 
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higher education. But can the old way of financing education through public 
funding also be thought of as a form of!CL? Individuals can be thought of as 
paying for their education retroactively, by giving the govermnent a (large) 
share of their incremental income. There is a distinction: those who did not go 
to college pay as well as those that do. This, then, is the critical distinction -
in effect, a higher tax rate for those who avail themselves of a college 
education than those that do not. But, of course, efficient investment requires 
that individuals pay for the costs of education. The risk sharing associated 
with !CL should lead to more investment in education than would be the case 
under current arrangements, even if individuals are not capital constrained. 
Given the large benefits - non-pecuniary as well as monetary - to a college 
education, the tmderinvestment (if any) in education for those who have 
sufficient wealth is likely to be small. 
But for those who do not have funds of their own, risk sharing is important. 
They have to borrow, and with conventional loaus, were they to pay the full 
costs of a college education, their level of indebtedness would be very high. If 
their income turned out to be low, the consequences for their living standards 
would be very adverse. The realization of this would inhibit undertaking a 
college education, even if the expected returns exceeded the costs by a 
substantial amount. There would be significant tmderinvestment in education.3 
In a world in which everyone went to colleges costing the same amount, a 
comprehensive !CL iu which everyone had to participate would be little 
different (apart from the intergeneratioual issues to be noted below) from 
public funding. ICL typically entails a linear relationship between repayment 
and income, and most countries have adopted slightly progressive tax systems, 
but in principle, there is nothing to restrict !CL to linear schedules. (In fact, 
various provisions in most !CL programs - for example, forgiveness of the 
residual debt after a certain number of years - do make the repayment 
function non-linear.) If almost everyone went to colleges costing the same 
amount, would there be any point of having a separate !CL program? Would it 
be simpler to provide a tax rebate to the few people who did not go to college? 
(The optics of rewarding people for not going to college might not be so 
positive, but functionally, it does not appear to be different from taxing those 
who do.) 
Adverse incentive effects are likely to be small, so long as income tax rates 
and !CL repayment rates combined are not too large. But in countries with 
already high income tax rates, the marginal disincentive effect will have to be 
considered. There are a large number of decisions that may be affected by the 
implicit tax associated with !CL: labor supply, retirement, job choice 
(including risk taking), compensation packages (with repayments limited to 
twenty years, there is an incentive for hard-to-value deferred compensation 
schemes). So long as the !CL repayment percentage is relatively low, the 
magnitude of these effects will be limited. 
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A standard objection to government loan programs is that, if the returns are 
so high, why doesn't the private market provide the fimds? There are two 
retorts: first, there are significant economies of scope in collection, arising 
through the income tax system. What is easy and feasible for the government 
may not be possible or be expensive for the private sector; second, the 
government is pursuing a social welfare maximization objective markedly 
different from that of the private sector. With a utilitarian social welfare 
function, for instance, pooling is socially efficient and desirable. But there 
cannot be pooling in a private market economy. 
Most importantly, government is concerned with equality of opportunity 
and (if there is an inequality-averse social welfare function) of income. Even 
if government were to make funds available to anyone who wanted to borrow, 
with conventional loans, many of those from poor families would not be 
willing to borrow. As a result, society would be afflicted with a low level of 
equality of opportunity. ICL loans change all of this, because now, the risk 
borne by the individual is reduced to a more manageable level. 
However, there are further market failures associated with private sector 
insurance and loan programs, especially associated with cross-market 
externalities. For instance, greater student indebtedness may affect the ability 
to repay other loans. Government programs can be designed to be sensitive to 
these externalities. Furthermore, there are externalities to numerous 
government programs. Because the consequences of not having a job are more 
severe with a conventional loan, an individual who has lost his job may search 
harder (reducing 1memployment insurance payments, with benefits both to the 
unemployment insurance fund and to the government's Treasury), but may 
have a lower reservation wage in accepting a job - introducing an inefficiency 
into the economic system. Some of the benefits of a more educated labor force 
accrue to the government, in the form of higher tax revenues. Obviously, a 
private lender would not include these benefits in the calculus of whether he 
should lend to an individual and the terms at which he would make loans 
available. 
There are, of course, other ways that social objectives of enhancing equality 
of opportunity and access to education can be achieved, in particular through 
public provision of education. This is a route that has traditionally been taken 
by many countries. It has two disadvantages. The first is that ICL facilitates 
self-selection: those who do not expect to get sufficient returns out of 
education will not choose to get a college or advanced education. Especially if 
education has consurnption value, then with free education there will be 
excessive consumption. Efficiency will require a greater burden being borne 
by screening. 
Probably more important, however, are the fiscal realities, in political 
economies driven by myopic governments (and the citizens who elect them): 
there is a concern about budget deficits even if the spending is used to 
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increase assets, enhancing the economy's productivity and future tax revenues. 
Few governments have capital accounts which would help citizens assess the 
extent to which greater indebtedness is incurred to finance consumption or 
investment. Pressures to keep taxes and debts low mean that public financing 
of higher education cannot be relied upon. The overall national level of 
indebtedness is, of course, the same whether the government borrows to 
finance education, or if individuals borrow. Indeed, there can be distinct 
advantages to the latter, for borrowing costs are likely to be far lower (partly 
because of the lower transactions costs alluded to earlier in this note). 4 
Nonetheless, the desire to move the indebtedness off of the government's 
balance sheet onto private individual's balance sheets has had probably more 
to do with the reliance on student debt for financing higher education than 
anything else. 
2.2 Seeing ICL within a broader set of capital instruments 
Stiglitz and Yun (2013; Chapter 16, this volnrne) consider a set of instruments 
that provide societal risk sharing for individuals who have large adverse 
shocks, but not for small shocks (loans that are, effectively, forgiven in the 
event of extended unemployment). Let R be the repayment as a function of 
lifetime income Y. The simplest ICL has R = aY. But a more general scheme 
is R = F(Y). For example, 
_ { R* if Y > Y* 
R- aY if Y < Y' 
where R* = a.Y*, or, 




Different payments schemes will have different · incentive and 
implementation (compliance) costs and, if there is not nniversal compnlsion to 
join the scheme, different adverse selection effects. An important research 
question is to assess the relative merits of alternative repayment functions, 
under alternative assnrnptions. 
If we have a situation where there is a well-defined income tax system, 
given by T = T(Y, G) for every level of G, then if there is a group of 
individnals who are provided with additional benefits costing 6.G (in the 
simplest case, the entire popnlation), and it is determined that they should be 
self-financed, then the repayment function for the program shonld presnrnably 
be: 
R(Y,G,D.G) = 
The full analysis 
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R(Y, G, !::...G) ""T(Y, G + t::..G) - T(Y, G). (3) 
The full analysis of the shape of the optimal repayment function is quite 
complicated. Here, I suggest three considerations:5 
(i) Those at the top receive disproportionately large amounts from rents 
and/or good luck, so that the adverse incentive effects of marginally 
increased recoupment rates will be small. There should be at least 
some progressivity in the repayments schedule. 
(ii) If there is some complementarity across skills - those in certain areas 
generating higher productivity for lower wage workers, and thus 
improving the before-tax distribution of income - tax rates in such 
occupations may be lower than they otherwise would be (see Stiglitz, 
1998). 
(iii) Fixed obligations at the bottom can have strong incentive effects, 
especially if there is a stigma associated with bankruptcy. But 
because the revenue raised is small (unless there are large numbers of 
such individuals) and the suffering of these individuals is significant 
- and the anticipation of such suffering may be a large deterrent to 
lower income individuals undertaking education, and so has strong 
adverse incentive effects on education - it seems preferable to have 
programs which entail total debt forgiveness when income falls 
below a critical threshold. 
It will be important to assess whether there is a need for better screening -
that is, should there be full reliance on self-selection into the ICL loan/tertiary 
education program, or whether there should be admissions officers. The fact 
that income is low even with a college education does not mean that the 
individual should not have gone to school; we have to assess the 
counterfactual of what his income (and broader life satisfaction) would have 
been in the absence of the school. It may be, however, that individnals are not 
good at assessing these private and social returns. 
2.3 ICL as an instrument for investment in the young and social 
protection 
The reason that ICL is a natural fit for education is that young people 
obviously cannot finance their own investments in education. But there is a 
broader need for intertemporal smoothing, b01rowing younger in life in order 
to make investments that yield a return later in life or to smooth out a 
temporary loss in income (as a result of a bout of unemployment) or a 
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temporary increase in income needs (such as might arise in the event of an 
illness, in the presence of imperfect disability insurance.) 
As Stiglitz and Yun (2013; Chapter 16, this volume) point out, the need for 
smoothing through loans depends on the extent to which there is insurance 
(which smoothes income across states of nature). Moral hazard and adverse 
selection arise in both loans and insurance, and there are important cross-
market externalities. Even in the limited case of a market characterized by a 
single set ofrisks (unemployment in different periods) solving for the optimal 
mix of insurance and loans turns out to be inordinately complicated. 
Given the importance of human capital (for most individuals early in their 
life, it represents the predominant form of wealth), the benefits of better ways 
of sharing the risks associated with human capital should be obvious. This is 
especially so in the context of individuals undertaking fixed large obligations 
today for payments in the future. Thus, if an individual faces a short bout of 
lmemployment early on in life, the impact on his or her lifetime income will 
be negligible, and a conventional loan (perhaps collateralized by future 
retirement benefits) has the advantage of having no adverse incentive effects. 
In such a situation, the benefits of risk mitigation from an !CL are negligible, 
and (at least in standard models) would be outweighed by the adverse 
incentive effects (though these could be small). But the problem is that the 
future is uncertain: there is uncertainty about whether an individual who faces 
a short bout of unemployment today will face further bouts in the future, to 
such an extent that the repayment of a loan today would impose hardship later 
in life. Income contingent loans are a good way of handling such uncertainty. 
The liabilities that are encountered in paying for tertiary education are not 
small; nor are those that might be encountered as part of extended periods of 
unemployment or disability, or other temporary but large needs associated 
with child rearing. One could imagine extending !CL to any of these arenas. 
Questions, however, arise: 
(i) As the obligations increase, so too do the adverse incentive effects 
(both adverse effects on generating income and on reporting income). 
Is there a threshold above which we should become worried? 
(ii) In the case of tertiary education, it is relatively easy to force a pooling 
equilibrium. In the case of other areas, this may be more difficult. (If 
!CL were part of an unemployment scheme, high income individuals 
might claim to not be unemployed, so as not to be forced to 
participate; they can easily create low income generating consultancy 
firms.) Without pooling, !CL can still work, but it would serve a 
limited group of high risk/highly risk averse individuals. 
(iii) As the domain of activities covered increases and the size of the !CL 
program(s) increase, there can be important interactions (externalities) 
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volume), for instance, focus on the effect on job search of 
unemployment compensation; but they note that individuals may 
undertake excessive precautionary savings, bec.ause they do not take 
into account the adverse effect of such savings on search and 
employment, with implications in turn for the costs of the 
unemployment insurance system. 
This raises the further question: are there institutional designs (including 
alternative variants of the repayment function) which mitigate the adverse 
incentive and selection effects? Which lead to less adverse externalities? For 
example, Singapore's Provident Fund (allowing spreading of risks across 
different kinds of shocks) may allow better risk mitigation without adverse 
incentive effects than the separate funds (1memployment, disability, retirement) 
that characterize the dominant forms of social protection. Such a system 
forces pooling across these risks. 
2.4 Transition 
Consider a standard overlapping generations life cycle model, where each 
generation pays for the education of its children. In effect, generation t makes 
a large transfer of wealth to generation t + 1. In a steady state, they feel this is 
just, because when they were young, they received a transfer from generation 
t - 1. But now, consider what happens if we change the system to one where 
each generation pays for its own education. Now, generation t received a gift 
from its parents, but does not bequeath the same gift onto its descendants. 
Any notion of intergenerational equity would say such a redistribution is 
'unfair', unless, that is, generation t made an offsetting larger transfer to 
generation t + 1 in a different form. But something like that may be happening: 
as niany countries switch from pay-as-you go social insurance programs to 
fully funded programs (or at least more fully funded programs), the current 
generation is being asked both to pay for their parent's retirement and to pay 
for their own retirement. 
How pmticular members of each generation are affected by these complex 
shifts of burdens and responsibilities across generations is an important issue 
that should be addressed in future research - as is the question of whether the 
benefits of these large intertemporal shifts in burdens and responsibilities are 
worth the costs. 
Notes 
I. For a review of the basic economics of ICL see Chapman (2010; and Chapter 1, this 
volume), Chapman and Hunter (2009), and Quiggin (Chapter 3, this volume). 
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2. Pooling refers to individuals of different characteristics (different future income profiles) 
being within the same program. As we note below, ICL can be thought of a loan 
program plus an insurance progra1n for those whose income turns out to be low, 
financed by those whose income turns out to be high. But in markets, those who know 
that their income is likely to be high will attempt to 'separate' themselves out, so that 
the premium they would have to pay for this income insurance is reduced. That is why 
there may have to be forced pooling. 
3. In most countries, bankn1ptcy laws provide for some risk sharing: those whose incomes 
are very low can get a fresh start. But so-called bankruptcy reform in the US has made it 
almost impossible to discharge student debt, increasing the consequences of adverse 
outcomes and further discouraging investments in education. 
4. Moreover, from a social point of view, the risks are the same, except with public 
finance there is de facto better risk pooling. Securitization of student loans has increased 
the extent of risk pooling; but the US mortgage crisis has highlighted fundamental 
problems with securitization, including the role of ratings agencies in assessing the risks 
associated with various financial products and the limitations of the abilities of the 
rating agencies and distortions in their incentives. 
5. The similarity between this and the standard optimal tax problem should be obvious. 
Here, we are maximizing a social welfare function aggregating expected utilities of 
different individuals, where individuals may differ in both their abilities and 
idiosyncratic risks, and where they are making decisions not just about labor supply, but 
about education and jobs. 
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